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1. Introduction 
The Austrian health care system shows a federalist and decentralised structure with a public-
private mix in provision. In particular, the federal government, the nine federal provinces and 
self-governed social health insurance (SHI) are the key players in the health care sector. 
According to article 10 of the Austrian constitution, the federal government has responsibility 
over most areas of the Austrian health care system. The most important exception is the 
hospital sector, where according to article 12 of the Austrian constitution the basic framework 
is defined by federal law while more detailed legislation as well as its execution is the 
responsibility of the nine federal provinces excluding sanitary supervision, which is carried 
out by the district administration as agent of the federal government. 
Problems of health care are rooted in the structures of sectoral segmentation. Additionally, 
these problems are intensified by the financing mechanisms which are partly determined by 
the Austrian federalist structure. 
Health care in Austria has developed into a supply model based on decentralised contracts 
with service providers. These contracts are negotiated between health insurance funds and 
private service providers for the outpatient sector, whereas in the inpatient sector, federal 
and state cooperation is necessary, together with some non-profit hospital owners. This 
cooperation is governed by agreements based on “article 15a” of the Austrian constitution, 
which is renewed every three or five years. The outpatient and rehabilitation sectors are 
mainly the competence of the different social insurance institutions (all three areas: work-
accident insurance, health insurance and pension insurance in the case of rehabilitation), 
whereas the inpatient sector is financed by the State Health Funds. This composition leads 
to an imbalance of cost objects because the Social Security Institutions contribute a lump-
sum payment to the State Health Funds (about 43% of patient-relevant hospital costs) but do 
not have a voice in decision-making processes. Interface problems, therefore, lie especially 
in the fragmentation of the inpatient and outpatient sector, but also occur between preventive 
measures, general practitioners, medical specialists and rehabilitation, as there are no joint 
data infrastructures or electronic patient records yet. Interface problems between the 
inpatient and outpatient sector can be traced back to the mercantilist-cameralist movement 
in the 18th and 19th century that played a strong role in the provision of public infrastructure. 
It had a major influence on the development of hospital services leading to a strong link of 
organisation and financing of the Austrian health care sector and state institutions (Theurl, 
1999). This affinity was strengthened by the general act on social insurance (“Allgemeines 
Sozialversicherungsgesetz”) coming into force. 
The following Figure 1 gives an overview of the Austrian situation of sectoral fragmentation in 
health care financing. Interface problems are illustrated with flashes and moreover the lack 
of coordination among sectors is represented by the separation of the boxes.  
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Figure 1: Fragmentation of Austrian health care financing
 
Source: Czypionka and Röhrling, 2009 
 
In addition, the segmented organisation of the inpatient sector among the nine federal 
provinces can lead to an inefficient provision of specialisations and services between 
hospitals (i.e. a hospital in Upper Austria offers the same specialised services as a 
neighbouring hospital ten kilometres away in Salzburg). The Austrian Structural Plan for 
Health, developed on the federal level and broken down into regional structure plans, has 
not yet succeeded in providing more co-ordination across borders. 
Hitherto, no overall electronic system of health records that has the advantage of providing 
full information of a patient’s medical history and prescriptions has been implemented. The 
aim of an electronic health record is to avoid parallel services and the prescription of 
inappropriate drugs as well as to provide co-ordinated care over time. Major drawbacks 
concern data privacy and the abuse and illegal access to collected data. On top of that, there 
is apparently opposition to more transparency. The first step in this direction has been taken 
with the Austrian Health Care Reform in 2005 in which supplements of data privacy 
requirements were specified. 
The challenges that have to be overcome in order to provide co-ordinated care for people 
with chronic conditions lie primarily in the structural and financial segmentation of the 
Austrian health care system. Furthermore, the country’s federalist structure hinders efficient 
nationwide planning. 
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Subsequently, a case study analysing policies to improve care co-ordination is presented. 
The second chapter gives a historical overview of attempts that were taken in order to 
improve care co-ordination. In the third chapter, the status quo of Austrian health policies is 
assessed. Barriers and facilitators of implementing better care co-ordination in Austria are 
identified and analysed in chapter four, before the conclusion follows in chapter five. 
2. Attempts to improve care co-ordination 
The demographic development will weigh heavy on the Austrian healthcare system 
especially in the second and third decade of the century. Additionally, the epidemiological 
change towards chronic illness affects Austria as much as many other highly developed 
countries. 
Figure 2 gives an overview of the comparison of past and current life expectancies, disease 
spectrum, possible treatments and the share of elderly people. The projected life expectancy 
at birth in 2030 is about 13 years higher than in 1971, with an increase of almost 60% of 
people at the age of 65 and above. These developments and further medical progress led to 
a change in the disease spectrum from acute to chronic and turning possible treatments form 
“eminence-based” to “evidence-based”. 
Figure 2: Stylised facts
 
Source: Statistik Austria (key indicators, forecasts), display: IHS HealthEcon, 2012 
The shift from acute to chronic diseases has major implications for the provision of medical 
services. Chronic diseases require trans-sectoral, evidence based care, which has to 
overcome interface problems between the inpatient and outpatient sector. The Austrian 
Health Interview Survey (HIS) determines which chronic diseases are the most common. 
Figure 3 shows the results of the HIS of 2006/2007 for people at the age of 60 and older. In 
addition, as people grow older and increasingly suffer from chronic diseases, multi-morbidity 
is more likely. 
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Figure 3: Chronic diseases at the age of 60+ in Austria 
 
Source: Statistik Austria Health Interview Survey 2006/2007, Illustration: IHS HealthEcon, 2012 
Austria’s expenses on health care are among the highest in the European Union and the 
proportion of GDP spent on health care increases. Figure 4illustrates the development of 
health care expenditures in Austria as a share of GDP from 1960 to 2010. Since 1990 total 
expenditures on health care rose from about 7% to 11% in 2009. The increase is mainly due 
to the aging population, increased coverage and improvements in medical technology. In 
2008 expenditures in per cent of GDP rose sharply because of a decline of GDP due to the 
financial crisis, even though they remained on a similar level. For this reason, the 
“affordability” of health care under the principles of maintaining or even augmenting the 
current quality level has been the main objective of the reforms undertaken. 
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Figure 4: Austrian health care expenditure in % of GDP between 1960 and 2010 
 
Data Source: OECD, 2012; Illustration: IHS HealthEcon, 2012 
2.1. Rising demand for Co-ordinated Care 
Co-ordination was first demanded in the field of psychiatric care and care for elderly people. 
In 1987, for example, Badelt (1987) pointed out the necessity for co-ordinated care for 
elderly people in Vorarlberg. 
The first legal step towards co-ordinated care can be found in the development plans for the 
“article 15a” agreement of 1993. The agreement states that services in all settings of care 
have to be provided in a co-ordinated way. Even though provinces are responsible for the 
provision of long-term care, all provinces are required to follow the same principles and 
broad goals of care (Kraus & Riedel, 2010). 
Although the fragmentation of the inpatient and outpatient sector has been in place since the 
19th century, there were only few demandsfor reform until the late 1990s. Theurl (1999, 
p.333) mentions this problem explicitly:  
“The huge differences in the historical development of different provinces relates to the 
differing ownership structure of public hospitals. The split of the service guarantee is one 
important reason for the lack of integrated forms of health care services”. 
One principal reason to address these intersection problems in the late 1990s was that the 
Federal Government and the social security institutions tried to contain cost. 
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In 2000, the Austrian Court of Audit addressed this point in its perception report about the 
Austrian health care reform and hospital financing. The Austrian Court of Audit criticised that 
the structural commission failed to force structural changes in the health care sector and to 
further care integration. It also indicated that it is difficult to overcome the complexity of co-
ordination caused by the jurisdictional tangle of inpatient, outpatient, care and rehabilitation 
sectors. From 2000 onwards, the Austrian Court of Audit repeatedly pointed out the lacking 
efforts to overcome the sectoral fragmentation in the health care system, i.e. the report 
examining the health care reform of 2005 gives a sobering impression of the impacts of 
measures taken (Österreichischer Rechnungshof, 2010/2). 
2.2. Key National Policies and Reforms in the Health Care Sector 
In 1978, the first “15a agreement” with a “revenue-oriented expenditure policy” was enacted 
in order to contain costs. Later, in the 1990’s, the Austrian National Assembly agreed on a 
number of reforms with the key aim to ensure the financial sustainability of the health care 
system. 
The reforms of 1997 included the introduction of the Austrian DRG system 
“leistungsorientierte Krankenanstaltenfinanzierung” (LKF), covering only the inpatient 
departments. In terms of attempts to improve care co-ordination, a consultation mechanism 
between the social insurance institutions and the federal provinces was established. In case 
that the federal provinces infringe jointly agreed plans, a sanctioning mechanism was 
defined but never used so far. Additionally, the Austrian Hospital and Major Equipment Plan 
(ÖKAP/GGP) was established, which also included schemes for hospital outpatient 
departments, a location plan for fund-contracted physicians, a long-term care sector plan 
and a rehabilitation plan. 
The ÖKAP/GGP not only specified the locations of hospitals but also stipulated services 
offered and the number of beds per hospital. Due to the changing age structure and the 
variation of encountered diseases in acute medical care, the plan was revised and extended 
in 1999. For the first time, sectors of acute geriatrics/remobilisation and concepts for 
coverage with palliative care were included in the plan as well as the integration of a 
psychiatry plan and the inclusion of minimum standards for intensive care units. The 
success, however, was minimal, as the provinces objected to this strong federal influence in 
their agenda. Nevertheless, most likely due to the delicate relations between the federal and 
provincial governments, the sanction mechanism was never used. 
Between 2000 and 2004, another set of reforms was introduced with the main objective of 
cost containment and budget consolidation. These reforms resulted in a harmonisation of 
contribution rates of different groups (i.e. wage and salary earners) and an increase in the 
rates to additionally cover the risks of leisure time accidents. Furthermore, contributions of 
pensioners rise annually by 0.25 percentage points until they reach 4.75 % of the respective 
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pension. Another important aspect of these reforms is the agreement between the federal 
government and the federal provinces on quality work with defined quality goals. Projects 
were implemented focusing on topics such as patient orientation, interface management and 
quality reporting. 
In addition, the ÖKAP/GGP was updated according to demographic and medical 
developments in 2001 and 2003. Part of the reform was the integration of the first psychiatric 
services plan (Hofmarcher & Rack, 2006). 
In 2005, the implementation of various measures with the main objectives of budget 
consolidation, cost containment and quality assurance followed based on the Health Care 
Reform of the same year. The Health Care Reform’s emphasis is laid on integrated care and 
interface management. The 73rd agreement pursuant to “article 15a”, edited on July 12, 
2005, formulates the intention to erase the existing fragmentation of current sectors of 
service provisions in article 3 (integrated Structural Plan for Health) and explicitly names 
inpatient and ambulatory care, rehabilitation and other care sectors. In addition, an area-
wide and intra-sectoral hospice and palliative care system should be planned and 
introduced. Furthermore, the compulsory basis for integrated planning is implicitly defined in 
the Austrian Structural Plan for Health, in Article 5, clause 3 (Republik Österreich, 2005). 
The Health Care Reform 2005 aimed to (Herber, 2007): 
 overcome the sectoral boundaries in the health care system and to improve the co-
ordination of planning, controlling and financing; 
 assure long-term financial management with measures of cost containment and 
raising efficiency; 
 support preventive measures and nationwide indemnification and improvement of 
quality; 
 enforce transparency; 
 promote interface management and  
 match the requirements for the use of information technology. 
As part of the framework of the Health Care Reform 2005 an “area of cooperation” within the 
State Health Funds was defined, encompassing the tasks lying in between the inpatient and 
outpatient sector. Projects at this interface can be financed by the so-called Reformpool. 
Furthermore, harmonisation of documentation, of clear demarcation of contents and the 
assignment of scores to case-based payments in other areas of care should lead to better 
adjustment of the Austrian DRG model to the possibilities of service-provision in the 
outpatient-sector and registered doctors-sector. Another instrument to develop integrated 
health care in Austria was the Austrian Structural Plan for Health, which is the basis for 
integrated planning of the Austrian health care structure pursuant the 2005-2008 15a 
agreement and represents the framework for the overall planning on the regional level 
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(Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, 2012a). This plan involves inpatient and outpatient care 
as well as acute and long-term care, including rehabilitation and interfaces between care 
sectors, as a successor to the ÖKAP/GGP. Table 1 gives an overview of the key reforms 
addressing the coordination of care. 
Table 1: Timeline of key reforms impacting on care co-ordination 
Year Reform 
1993 Introduction of insurance for long-term care for elderly and handicapped people. 
1997 Establishment of a consultation mechanism between social insurance institutions 
and the nine federal provinces (Bundesländer), introduction of the structural 
fund, the nine provincial funds and the Structural Commission, introduction of the 
Austrian Hospital and Major Equipment Plan (ÖKAP/GGP). 
1998 Group practices become possible. 
2001& 
2003 
Update of the Austrian Hospital and Major Equipment Plan (ÖKAP/GGP), 
integration of the psychiatric service plan. 
2005 Integrated Planning with the Austrian Structural Plan for Health (ÖSG); 
Establishment of the Federal Health Agency and the Federal Health Commission 
as well as nine Federal Health Funds with the Health Platforms; 
Introduction of the Reformpool-project to finance projects at the intersection of 
the inpatient and outpatient sector, comparable documentation, health telematics 
and e-prescription 
2006 Introduction of the Disease Management Programmeon Diabetes mellitus 
Type 2 
2008 Explicit mentioning of integrated care in the Federal Constitution in “article 15a” 
on hospital financing; advancement and further development of measures 
introduced in 2005 
Sources: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, 2012b; Czypionka & Röhrling, 2009; Hofmarcher & Rack, 
2006
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2.3. Reformpool 
In the framework of the Austrian health care reform in 2005, the cooperation area within the 
state health funds was defined. This area covers those tasks in between the in- and 
outpatient sector. As neither the provincial health funds nor social security institutions are 
fully responsible for these tasks, financial issues arise. The Reformpool is a fund for projects 
concerning specifically these interfaces. The principal aim of those projects is a service shift 
between the in-and outpatient sector benefiting both the provinces and social security 
institutions. For the years 2005 and 2006 up to 1% of total health care expenditure could be 
reserved for such Reformpool-projects. In 2007 and 2008 the amount could be raised up to 
2% (Czypionka & Röhrling, 2009). These funds represent only a virtual cap and if projects 
were not commissioned, they remained and could be used for regular health care activities. 
In 2005, the Federal Health Agency published guidelines for the Reformpool projects 
specifying goals, suitability, documentation, evaluation and the institutionalisation of a regular 
exchange of information. The expansion and actualisation of the “article 15a” agreement in 
2008 explicitly states the aim of financing projects on integrated care (Czypionka & Röhrling, 
2009) and that documentation of the status quo and of the change in performance outcomes 
is required. Regarding the issue of the merely virtual availability of Reformpool-funds, there 
was only a re-formulation in the actualisation of the “article 15a”- agreement in 2008, but the 
funds remain virtual. 
In addition, further guidelines were passed containing province-specific special regulation for 
the course of projects. For example, in Upper Austria, these guidelines point out that 
anybody has the right to submit a project whereas the costs of formulating the project idea 
have to be paid for by the applicant. The Health Platforms can afterwards admit the project 
to the next phase in which it is submitted as a Reformpool-project. The costs of the second 
phase still have to be borne by the applicant. The second phase ends with the handover of a 
report to the state health fund. If the health platform decides in favour of the project, a 
realisation project starts.The project ends with a report containing the evaluation of forecast 
effects. In connection with the report, the applicant submits a Reformpool-plan suggesting a 
real operation of the project. If the health platform approves of it, the real operation starts 
with on-going evaluation during the process. It is necessary that the Reformpool-project is 
beneficial for both the provinces and SHI. This Reformpool process cycle seems complicated 
but comes with the advantage of permanent monitoring (Czypionka & Röhrling, 2009). 
The ultimate goal after the test of the project and positive evaluation is the introduction of the 
project into real operation, financed by the provincial health funds or SHI. 
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2.4. Disease Management Programmes (DMPs) 
Disease Management Programmes (DMPs) structure the process of care and thus try to 
overcome several shortcomings of current medical practices. They are primarily used to treat 
patients with chronic diseases. DMPs started in the USA with the launch of blood glucose 
monitoring for Diabetes patients in the 1980s followed by various DMPs in the 1990s 
(Chandaver, 2007). The Disease Management Association of America defines Disease 
Management as a “system of co-ordinated health care interventions and communications for 
populations with conditions in which patient self-care efforts are significant” (Care Continuum 
Alliance, 2011). Patients should be motivated via these programmes to better manage their 
disease. In addition, the aim is to monitor them actively following evidence-based guidelines 
and to co-ordinate care among all providers (Congressional Budget Office, 2004). 
The motivation to introduce DMPs in Austria started with rising health care expenditures. 
Since the health care reform of 2005, there are several DMPs in Austria dealing among 
others with Diabetes mellitus type 2, strokes, breast cancer, palliative care and coronary 
heart diseases. In 2004 the Styrian sickness fund and the Institute for Biomedicine and 
Health Science of Johanneum Research started to develop a DMP on behalf of Austrian 
SHI’s programme “Therapie Aktiv” (Österreichische Sozialversicherung, 2006). The 
programme was implemented in 2007 (Therapie Aktiv, 2012a). It consists of regular 
examinations, training, the agreement to individual targets with a practitioner and informative 
literature. Patients can participate free of charge and voluntarily in the DMP and terminate 
their participation at any time. During the regular examinations, the physician conducts (or 
refers the patient to) a haemodynamometry and a weight check, every six months an HbA1c-
control and once a year an anamnesis, a foot inspection, a check on neuropathy, 
ophthalmologic control, cardiovascular risk stratification and an urine test (Czypionka et al. 
2011). The national quality guidelines for DMPs (Bundesqualitätsleitlinien) should ensure a 
nationwide and trans-sectoral quality level, anchored in the national law for quality of health 
care services (GQG). 
Physicians are paid for their service provided and, in addition, receive a capitation payment 
per treated DMP-patient per quarter. The physician completes a documentation form when 
the patient is registered with the DMP and subsequently every year. The physician is obliged 
to participate in a four-hour basic training and thereafter in a two-hour refreshing course 
every two years. The remuneration for physicians participating in “Therapie Aktiv” differs 
across regions depending on the specific health insurance fund. In Lower Austria, the 
physician is remunerated with 53 € for the first examination and afterwards is paid 25 € per 
quarter in addition to usual fees. For the training of insulin-dependent patients in small 
groups (three to five), a doctor receives 1,064 € (Czypionka et al. 2011). The remuneration in 
Upper Austria is comparable, as physicians receive 66 € for the first examination, 19 € and 
43 € for the quarterly and annual check-up respectively as well as 690.39 € for the training of 
a diabetes-group (OÖGKK 2011). 
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Table 2: Characteristics of selected policies to improve care co-ordination in Austria 
 Who is the target 
group? 
Which gaps in co-ordination does the policy aim to 
address? 
Pathway for 
implementation 
Which incentives to 
participate exist? 
Evaluation 
  Type of 
integration 
Breadth of 
integration 
Degree of 
integration 
   
Reformpool Payers, Providers Clinical, 
informational, 
financial 
Mostly 
Indication-
oriented 
Linkage or co-
ordination 
Decentralised: provincial 
health funds make 
decisions  
Voluntary: funds for 
Reformpool projects 
reduce the budget for 
everyday services 
Incentive problems for 
payers and providers: 
Virtual nature of financing 
increases risk for project 
initiators; funds reduce 
the available amount for 
everyday services in the 
in- and outpatient sector, 
decreasing incentives for 
payers; both province and 
social health insurance 
have to benefit 
Mandatory 
evaluation of 
clinical 
outcomes and 
costs, e.g. via 
the controlling 
instrument 
“Reformpool 
manager”; 
however, often 
missing 
Disease 
Management 
Programmes 
Patients, 
Providers 
Clinical, 
informational 
Indication-
oriented model 
Linkage or co-
ordination 
Decentralised: there are 
different DMPs in some 
provinces 
Voluntary: Participation 
is voluntary both for 
physicians and patients  
Physicians: Financial 
incentives 
Patients: Incentive to 
enjoy better care and 
support 
Evaluation 
efforts currently 
on their way 
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3. Assessment of the status quo 
As previously mentioned the main aim of the health care reform was to overcome sectoral 
boundaries in the health care system and to achieve improvements in the co-ordination of 
planning, controlling and financing in order to finance the Austrian health care system in a 
more sustainable way. The previous “article 15a” agreements included plans for integrated 
care. The new “article 15a” agreement 2008-2013 and the new Reformpool-guidelines 
explicitly address integrated care for the first time, although projects already contained 
elements of integrated care before. Another key factor of the reform was information 
management. The introduction of an electronic medical record (ELGA) has the aim to 
provide seamless communication between hospitals, general practitioners and specialists 
and in this way contribute to overcome the fragmentation of the inpatient and outpatient 
sector. Up to now, ELGA has not yet been launched as several stakeholders are opposed. 
Regarding co-ordinated care, the Reformpool-projects and disease management lie at the 
core of the reform and their status-quo will be analysed in the following chapters. 
3.1. Reformpool 
(1) Development of structures 
The aim of the Reformpool is to solve existing interface problems by installing a common 
pool of funds for projects within the provincial health funds. Reformpool projects were 
expected to extend the breadth of integration across interfaces. The new Reformpool-
guidelines of 2008 make it explicitly possible to sponsor projects of integrated care, which 
had de facto already been the case before (Czypionka & Röhrling, 2009). In theory, anyone 
can develop a Reformpool project but, so far, mainly social security institutions and federal 
provinces have designed projects. It is difficult, though, to determine in what function federal 
provinces act as they are a political entity and additionally responsible for financing the 
inpatient sector. Up to 1% (in 2005 and 2006) and 2% (in 2007 and 2008) of total in- and 
outpatient expenditure could be made available for Reformpool-projects. The available 
funds, though, were not reserved for those projects, but reduced the total amount that could 
be spent in the inpatient and outpatient sectors. Notwithstanding, tariffs in the outpatient 
sector and hospital costs remained the same. 
(2) Participation of SHI funds and providers 
An analysis of Reformpool-activities by Czypionka and Röhrling (2009) shows a hesitant 
start in the first two years with an upswing in 2007, which was followed by a downturn in the 
following years. Error! Reference source not found. reflects a similar pattern, illustrating 
the number of running projects reaching from the fourth quarter of 2005 to the fourth quarter 
of 2010. In the third quarter of 2008, Reformpool-activity reached its peak at 38 
simultaneously running projects. During the last quarter of 2011 the number of current 
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projects decreased to 29. The average duration of a project is about 43 months (Czypionka 
& Röhrling, 2009).  
Figure 5: Number of running Reformpool-projects
 
Source: IHS HealthEcon questionnaire 2009, “Health System Watch”-Update 2012 
The progress of Reformpool-projects can be divided into three phases. Initially, the concept 
and design of the project is presented in phase one. In phase two, the project is authorised 
and implemented, before the evaluation follows in phase three. After the final evaluation, the 
Reformpool-project is either adopted into routine care or brought to an end 
(Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, 2012c). Table 3 gives an overview over the state of 
affairs of Reformpool-projects across provinces. In the third quarter of 2012, 30 Reformpool-
projects are running. Moreover, five projects are scheduled and four projects are under final 
evaluation. Out of the 22 projects that have been completed successfully, ten have been 
adopted into routine care. Besides, four projects were discontinued during the process.  
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Table 3: Reformpool-activities by provinces 
State 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Completed Adopted Cancelled 
Burgenland  4     
Carinthia 1 3   3  
Lower 
Austria 
 5  3 1  
Upper 
Austria 
4 2   2  
Salzburg  1 1 1   
Styria  2 2 3 4 1 
Tyrol  4  3  1 
Vorarlberg  5 1    
Vienna  4  2  2 
Austria 5 30 4 12 10 4 
Source: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 2012c (latest update June 11, 2012), Display: 
IHS HealthEcon 2012 
The majority of the projects (79%) deals with integrated care like the DMPs for Diabetes 
Mellitus type 2 and stroke units (Upper Austria, Styria, Tyrol and Vienna), care of coronary 
heart diseases (Lower Austria, Styria), care of nephrological diseases (Styria) and 
Discharge-/Interface-/Case- and Care Management (Burgenland, Lower Austria, Salzburg, 
Styria, Vorarlberg and Vienna) (Czypionka & Röhrling, 2009). 
The virtual nature of the Reformpool-funds caused the actual sum of investment to be much 
lower than 1% (2% respectively) of total in- and outpatient expenditure. On an aggregate 
level, only 15.8% of possible funds were used for Reformpool-investments per year in 
Austria. However, the activities among the nine provinces are quite different and reach from 
33% in Styria to only 1.5% in Tyrol. Figure 6 illustrates the fraction of money actually used for 
Reformpool-projects as share of the money available. 
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Figure 6: Fraction of available funds used for Reformpool-Projects per year
 
Source: IHS questionnaire 2009 
(3) Participation of patients 
The number of participating patients varies among projects. Czypionka and Röhrling (2009) 
analysed first Reformpool-evaluations and found that for example in Vorarlberg, it was 
assumed that 45 to 60 patients would take part in the project “mobile healthcare”, in total 53 
patients participated from October 2007 to August 2008. Another project regarding palliative 
care intended to reach 100 patients, but the actual number was only about one third. In the 
training project for Diabetes mellitus type 2 in Carinthia, more than 2,000 patients 
participated in the initial training, but the participation rate for follow-up trainings declined to 
40%. Furthermore, care-level varies highly among Carinthian districts, in the region of 
St.Veit/Glan only about 20 per cent of potential patients were trained. 
(4) Availability of evaluations 
Several Reformpool-projects can be considered as a success, both in medical and in 
economic terms. Several laws were enacted to ensure quality control (Health Quality Act), 
including several guidelines. Czypionka et al. (2006) analysed the evaluation procedure of 
quality control in medical practices that has been made compulsory for every office-based 
physician. However, they found that the methodology of the evaluation procedure itself has 
to be called into question.  
The following Table 4 illustrates the number of Reformpool-project per federal province, their 
mean of budgeted funds as well as the coefficient of variation for 2011. The highest average 
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amount of funds was planned in Upper Austria, followed by Lower Austria and Styria. The 
lowest average budget for Reformpool-projects was planned in Tyrol and Salzburg. The 
lowest-budgeted project is only about € 60,000, whereas, on the contrary, the project with 
the highest financial volume, the “hospice and palliative care institution” of Styria, has a total 
budget of € 9,500,000. It has to be mentioned though, that the size and therefore the costs of 
the projects are quite divergent, reducing the informative value of the average budgeted 
funds.  
Table 4: Statistics of Reformpool-projects
 
Source: Czypionka and RöhrlingUpdate 2012 
Although there is financial potential for such projects, there is no guarantee that a project will 
be adopted as a regular service or spread to other regions even if it is successful. 
The project “interdisciplinary admission department Horn” in Lower Austria is an example of 
a successful realisation of the Reformpool. Through this project, a significant reduction in 
hospital admission and days spent in the hospital as well as a cost reduction of € 2.4 million 
could be achieved. Additionally, a survey showed that both participating patients and 
physicians are satisfied with the project. The evaluation of another Lower-Austrian project 
(“integrated hospice- and palliative care in Lower Austria”) showed that cumulated synergies 
exceeded costs and satisfied persons concerned. The project “mobile palliative-team” in 
Vorarlberg is seen as a success too because life- and care-quality of palliative patients could 
be improved and inpatient palliative stations could be disburdened. Due to the lack of 
evaluation in many cases, not all benefits from the projects could be assessed.  
Comprehensive evaluations of the health and economic implications of Reformpool-projects 
remain scarce. The reluctance to evaluate is strengthened by the fact that it is still unclear 
whether the evaluation of Reformpool-projects is mandatory. The phrasing in the national 
guidelines is such that projects have to be evaluated, and that the guidelines are passed by 
the Federal Health Commission. But the legal status of such decisions by the FHC is not 
well-defined, which leads to confusion whether resolutions are legally mandatory. 
Number of 
projects
Mean 
budgeted 
funds
Coefficient of 
Variation
Burgenland 4 1.246.888 1,17
Carinthia 6 602.667 0,75
Lower Austria 6 2.182.332 1,22
Upper Austria 8 2.975.000 0,43
Salzburg 4 374.191 0,65
Styria 9 1.911.809 1,70
Tyrol 8 547.071 0,85
Vorarlberg 7 1.145.613 0,38
Vienna 7 1.207.846 1,19
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Independent from this question, there are no sanctioning mechanisms in place for not 
evaluating a project. 
For projects that are actually evaluated, results indicate the potential of cost reduction.The 
project “Interdisciplinary receiving station Horn” in Lower Austria, for example, could reduce 
costs by about € 2.4 million, which was even above the expected amount of € 2 million. The 
Upper-Austrian project “Diabetes Care Upper Austria” resulted in a total amount of € 49 per 
patient which compares favourably to a random sample of the basic population of diabetes 
patients. 
3.2. Disease Management Programmes 
(1) Participation of SHI funds 
The DMP “Therapie Aktiv” is used as representative of DMPs in Austria. As DMP for 
Diabetes Mellitus type 2, “Therapie Aktiv”, is the most widespread programme in Austria and 
is either a Reformpool-project or already adopted to daily routine in the provinces of Lower 
Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Vorarlberg, Vienna and Upper Austria (Czypionka et al., 2011). In 
Burgenland, a proprietary Disease Management Program called “Modell Burgenland” was 
introduced. Tyrol tested “Therapie Aktiv” as a Reformpool-project but did not adopt it to daily 
routine and it ended on December 31, 2010. For Carinthia, plans exist to implement 
“Therapie Aktiv”. Figure 7 shows a map of Austria, denoting the regions where “Therapie 
Aktiv” is in use. The orange colour shows federal provinces that implemented the 
programme; yellow denotes provinces with other DMPs and provinces pictured in grey do 
not currently have DMPs for Diabetes mellitus type 2 but offer trainings for patients suffering 
from diabetes. 
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Figure 7: Map of implementation of DMP Therapie Aktiv in Austria
 
Source: Therapie Aktiv, 2012; Translation: IHS 2012 
(2) Participation of physicians and patients 
Table 5 shows participating physicians and patients of the DMP “Therapie Aktiv”. Compared 
to the total number of eligible outpatient physicians, the number of physicians participating in 
a DMP is quite low compared to other countries (i.e. Germany). General practitioners and 
specialists for internal medicine (both contracted and without a contract) are eligible to 
participate.In total, about 15.3% of eligible physicians participate in the DMP-programme 
“Therapie Aktiv”. Vorarlberg and Upper Austria show a participation rate of physicians above 
average, whereas in Lower Austria and Vienna the number of registered physicians is still 
quite low. In addition, estimates assume about 420,000 diabetics (Wawrosky, 2010) in 
Austria, of which only about 7.7% currently participate in the DMP “Therapie Aktiv”. In 
Germany, the participation rates of Diabetes mellitus type 2 DMPs are estimated to be 
around 50% (Czypionka et al., 2011). The goal is to raise participation up to two-thirds of all 
pharmaceutically treated diabetes patients. 
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Table 5: Therapie Aktiv-participants 
 
Federal State 
Currently 
participating 
physicians 
Eligible 
physicians
1
 
Share of 
participating 
physicians 
Currently 
participating 
patients 
Lower Austria 152 1556 9.77% 5,081 
Upper Austria 300 1196 25.08% 8,152 
Salzburg 101 514 19.65% 1,777 
Styria 222 1145 19.39% 6,952 
Vorarlberg 69 290 23.79% 1,058 
Vienna 167 1904 8.77% 8,829 
Sum 1011 6605 15.31% 32,569 
 
Source: Therapie Aktiv (2012) (status September 2012), Ärztekammer (2012) and 
Ärzteverlagshaus(2012), display IHS HealthEcon 2012 
Note: Only federal provinces with current Therapie Aktiv-projects are listed 
A survey of participating practitioners and diabetics of “Therapie Aktiv” in Styria showed 
improved health outcomes for patients. Furthermore, 98% of total participants declared that 
they found it important to be involved in the DMP. Both diabetics and physicians look 
favourably upon the “Therapie Aktiv”-programme (Steiermärkische Gebietskrankenkasse 
2009 in: Czypionka et al. 2011), as the process-quality of diabetes-treatment could be 
improved significantly. 
Table 6 offers a concluding overview of the progress and stagnation of DMPs and integrated 
care contracts in Austria.
                                                     
1
Only general practitioners and internists (contracted or without contract) can participate in the “Therapie Aktiv”-
programme 
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Table 6: Progress and stagnation in the implementation of care co-ordination policies 
Parameter of (intermediate) 
policy effect (‘success’ or 
‘failure’) 
Disease management programmes Reformpool 
Up-take by payers  Up-take is differing by provinces; some successful 
projects such as “Integrierte Versorgung Schlaganfall” in 
Upper Austria are not spread to other provinces 
 High up-take in 2007 and 2008 
 BUT: Since 2009, evidence suggests largely stagnation in 
the number of running projects and because of the virtual 
character of funds, the incentive to start projects is very 
low 
Up-take by providers  Physicians’ acceptance and participation is still a 
weakness, they oppose the extensive 
administration/documentation required 
 High up-take in 2007 and 2008 
 BUT: stagnation since 2009 
Up-take by patients  Patient enrolment is low compared to other countries e.g. 
Germany  
 Low number of participants 
Development of structures  Documentation has been reduced 
 Intention to integrate required documentation in 
physician’s software 
 In some provinces (e.g. Styria) provision of help to re-
structure the organisation of medical practices 
 Virtual availability of fund is the main problem, the new 
“article 15”-agreement did not improve this issue 
 Still no legal obligation to introduce successful projects to 
regular operation 
Availability of evaluations  Thorough evaluation hardly exists or is not published 
 Concerns exist over insufficient quality assurance of 
medical documentation of DMP participants  
 Implications for refinement or abolition of the underlying 
initiatives thus remain unclear 
 Evaluation exists, but is very difficult  to access, the 
obtained results are ambiguous 
 Most programmes are not introduced to regular operation 
or to other provinces 
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4. Analysis of Barriers and Facilitators 
Several stakeholders of the Austrian health care system were interviewed in order to 
determine likely barriers and facilitators for the implementation of integrated care policies. 
The interview partners ranged from representatives of payers, i.e. social security institutions 
and the federal government, providers like representatives of the Austrian Chamber of 
physicians, health platforms and ÖGAM (Association of General Medicine) to patients’ 
representatives and experts in the field of health care. In the following, several findings from 
literature and the interviews with respect to care-coordination are presented. 
Overall, most interviewees share similar opinions on the improvements that can be achieved 
through better care co-ordination. Patients mainly highlight the advantages of better personal 
care, easy access to services and information, clearly defined contact persons, the 
continuum of care and the strong emphasis on the patient’s needs. Providers of health care 
defined the need to focus on their main tasks which may first result in a reassessment of 
their structure and finances leading to a clear allocation of tasks, a better flow of information 
as well as a more efficient and effective use of their own resources. Payers’ identified the 
reduction of redundancy, more efficient and effective organisational forms as well as the 
avoidance of over- and under-supply as measures to reduce costs. 
One of the interviewed experts summarises possible benefits of better care co-ordination as 
follows: 
The essential advantage would be the separation of care processes for chronically and 
acutely ill patients and thus reduce the claiming of benefits and with it costs of health care 
provision. The continuum of care would ensure better outcome, probably reduced costs and 
less stress for chronically ill patients. In general, the patient’s situation would improve 
because of less redundancy andless unnecessary appointments. This would cause the 
patient to feel to be taken care of. I think both patients and the health care system as a 
whole benefit if unnecessary treatments and costs can be avoided. Providers have to focus 
and decide what exactly they want to offer. The fragmentation of financing and decision-
making is one of the major problems, though. 
4.1. Key influencing factors 
(1) Challenges in the health care system 
Problems of the health care sector are often traced back to the federalist structure alongside 
the dual financing and sectoral separation. Indeed, the interviews confirm that this point is 
definitely important and a continuous obstacle for every arrangement that tries to span the 
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sectoral gap in the Austrian healthcare system. Interviewees point out the problem that 
various stakeholders with conflicting interests have to agree on guidelines. On several 
occasions, interviewees mention the existence of wrong frame conditions, e.g. the focus on a 
maximal instead of an optimal outcome. A representative of the Austrian Ministry of Health 
defines the most significant challenges for better care co-ordination in the following 
sentence: 
There exist immobile structures, mechanisms and behavioural patterns that have to be newly 
defined or dissolved, particularly the dual financing and the federalist structure. 
This illustrates a point that is relevant to actual change towards a better care coordination: 
Habits seem to play an important role in defining the relationship between stakeholders, 
particularly as ingrained habits are strengthened by the lack of competition. With respect to 
change, it will definitely be hard to overcome such a long-standing behaviour. 
Another stakeholder from the payers’ group thinks that the conflicting interests of 
stakeholders constitute a major obstacle: 
I see the challenges clearly lying with the providers and cost bearers. The cost bearers fail to 
bring providers together in order to negotiate and set their aims. Providers are very resistant 
and unfortunately I see deficits in their qualification. 
An expert comments on challenges in the health care system as follows: 
One major challenge is the disposition of payers to shift benefits; a co-ordinated action 
between the sectors, confidence in each other’s competencies, to ensure the necessary 
quality (to act evidence-based); to overcome federalism and the disposition to abide by 
quality guidelines and report the results. 
A patient’s representative sees the problems more in the conflicting interests of the 
stakeholders involved: 
… In reality it’s the payers’ loss of power … the difficulty to take all the stakeholders on board 
- the ones that are afraid, the ones that are in favour and the ones fearing a loss of power; 
and to build up acceptance and transparency. 
This problem is reflected in one of Leutz’ (1999) laws of integration: “The one that integrates 
calls the tunes”.  
A representative from the group of payers offers a similar perspective:  
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The main challenge is to balance the different system-based interests in order to reach a 
common perspective. 
(2) Culture of Evaluation 
Several interviewees from the different stakeholders have the opinion that several parts of a 
culture of evaluation, such as quality monitoring (particularly in the outpatient sector) hardly 
exist in Austria. Especially, the lack of defined outcome parameters is criticised by 
stakeholders. Interview partners were asked for their opinion on three different aspects of the 
culture of evaluation: quality monitoring and assessment, information systems and evidence-
based medicine/medical guidelines. 
(a) Quality monitoring and assessment 
When one of the experts was asked for his opinion on quality monitoring and 
assessment in Austria, his response was: 
 
In many cases quality monitoring is not existent or only rudimentary. I don’t know 
about quality monitoring; I only know that assessment on a wide basis and 
evaluation is carried out. 
 
A sickness fund representative especially sees quality as a problem monitoring and 
assessment in the outpatient sector: 
 
I think in recent years there was indeed some activity in the field of quality 
monitoring in the inpatient sector; it’s a subject they are working on, quality 
monitoring for office-based physicians is still a disaster though. 
 
Another representative from a sickness-fund criticises most notably the lack of 
outcome parameters: 
 
There is neither process management nor measurement of outcome, mainly 
because there simply don’t exist any defined outcome parameters. 
 
For the improvement of care-coordination, this definitely poses a problem, as the 
integration of care naturally encompasses efforts of evaluation. 
(b) Information systems 
In general, problems regarding information systems occur mainly at the interfaces, 
since hospitals and groups of physicians or single practices have some form of 
information system in place already. Another drawback of current information 
systems is the lack of performance evaluation.  
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The systems of ELGA and e-prescription, which have not yet been introduced, would 
considerably facilitate intra-sectoral communication, according to a patient’s 
ombudsman. 
 
One of the interviewed experts thinks that mainly physicians are opposed to intra-
sectoral information systems because it would make the detection of errors in 
treatments easier. Some providers may be afraid of a ranking too. In addition, issues 
of data privacy are addressed repeatedly as data on an individual’s health condition 
is very sensitive and many people are afraid of a loss of privacy rights and misuse of 
medical data that may happen as physicians will be able to access their medical 
history easily.  However, another expert stated that the concerns over “transparent 
doctors” seem to outweigh these concerns of “transparent patients” by far. 
 
In another interview it was suggested that the widespread scepticism among 
physicians towards the establishment of intra-sectoral information systems is mainly 
rooted in a general lack of know-how of methods used for quality control. 
 
Obviously, information systems spanning the sectoral gap are a prerequisite of 
integrated care, but they are largely absent in Austria. 
(c) Evidence-based medicine/ medical guidelines 
Evidence-based guidelines are the backbone of a DMP, as all providers in the 
process-chain have to contribute to the treatment in a predictable way. However, 
guidelines and evidence-based medicine are met with scepticism by representatives 
of the Austrian physicians (see e.g. Czypionka/Riedel/Röhrling 2006). 
 
In our interviews, it was mentioned several times, especially regarding DMP-
guidelines, that physicians do not see the need to change their procedures as they 
are successful and they are obviously satisfied with their results. Other physicians 
argue that they already follow medical guidelines. However, an interviewee points 
out that, although the physicians claim the opposite, they effectively fail to adhere to 
the medical guidelines in question. A sickness-fund representative thinks that most 
physicians fear to lose the freedom of treatment if guidelines were introduced.One of 
the experts comments on medical guidelines: 
 
Guidelines are ill-reputed as cookbook-medicine. 
(3) Governance 
The Austrian governmental structure is determined by federalism, which is mainly 
characterised by the separation of legislation and execution among the federal level and 
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individual federal provinces. Every Austrian federal province has its own legislature, the 
“Landtag”, a provincial government and a (politically very influential) governor. However, the 
legislative power of the provinces is limited and judiciary is exclusively a federal matter. 
Furthermore, the federal structure poses a challenge to the Austrian health care system. 
Health care is provided by the federal health fund, which is mainly financed by the federal 
government, the provincial health funds, which are financed by all levels of government and 
SHI, and moreover by the social security institutions (see Figure 1). 
Interviewed experts and stakeholders of the Austrian health care system were asked for their 
opinion on a form of self-government. All of them perceive the federal structure as a 
disadvantage for the operation of the health care system. 
One of the providers summarises the problem as follows: 
Federalism is historically seen as great achievement but actually it is a great barrier for the 
development of the health care system. It definitely has to do with the people working there 
[in decision-making institutions; author’s note] who I don’t know… but all the procedural 
things until they make a decision… There are too many different interests. That is obstructive 
for the co-ordination of care. 
A patients’ representative is more confident about the collaboration of federal provinces and 
social security institutions: 
The stakeholders are talking more and more frankly with each other. There are resolutions of 
the federal health commission that emphasise that the provinces and social security 
institutions have to collaborate. But it’s not really welcomed as it is connected with a certain 
loss of power. 
An expert of the Austrian health care system expresses his opinion as follows: 
The biggest challenge is the uncoordinated way of planning and financing in the health care 
system, which leads to the over- and under supply of care or to inadequate care. This is a 
big obstacle for integrated, patient-oriented care. 
A sickness-fund representative highlights problems of governance and coordination: 
There are serious governing problems, particularly in the inpatient sector and a lack of 
collaboration between federal provinces and social security institutions as well as co-
ordination problems within the social security. The decentralised structure is good, but its co-
ordination has to be improved, maybe by benchmarking or using models of best-practice… 
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(4) Sectoral fragmentation in provision, planning and financing 
The problem of sectoral fragmentation is widely discussed among health care experts in 
Austria, as the split of competencies and financing seems to be the major barrier for more 
care co-ordination. Every change towards optimal allocation of services across this sectoral 
gap would cause a (financial) winner and a loser. Moreover, the financial benefits of potential 
new models of care settings are in dispute: Provinces often argue that shifting services from 
hospitals to physicians does not reduce their fixed costs, so they are reluctant to shift funds 
that amount to the average costs of provision. On the other hand, SHI has no knowledge 
about the actual costs in private practices, and therefore uses the tariff system to calculate 
the funds to be shifted. However, these include some form of contribution margin for the 
physicians. In our interviews, this theoretical problem was indeed identified as the core 
question in all negotiations. 
Without doubt, a more efficient allocation of service provision could reduce costs and reduce 
efforts to shift costs. 
(5) Organisation of service provision 
The Austrian healthcare system allows a wide freedom of choice. Within the outpatient 
sector, patients can decide for themselves whether general practitioners or specialists are 
visited. The only restriction is that patients are usually only allowed to visit one practice per 
specialisation in a quarter. Experts repeatedly demand the introduction of a general 
practitioner-centred model with a gate-keeper function for the general practitioner (GP). It is 
often argued that this would constrain the patient’s freedom of choice. However, when 
considering such a model, it is important to take into account that Austrian GPs only receive 
three years of vocational training. Therefore, some stakeholders see the problem more in the 
lacking abilities of the physician. 
An interviewee from the payers’ group mentions this issue: 
The general practitioner wants to have the core competencies without having the know-how 
and without caring for the outcomes of the process. 
The specialist is more a lone fighter being opposed to the outpatient department. I think 
transparency and good co-ordination is better than the restricted access of a gatekeeper-
system. 
A patients’ representative is in favour of the gatekeeper-function, but stresses the importance 
of the freedom to choose the doctor: 
I could definitely be won over for the model of gate-keeping; specialists should only be 
accessible via a physician’s referral. However, what is close to our heart is the freedom to 
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choose one’s physician in the case of a loss of trust, for example. I’m definitely against 
obligatory referrals. 
A stakeholder from the group of providers sees the organisation of service provision as 
follows: 
The “Hausarzt” (family doctor) is not well defined, as well as other levels of care, resulting in 
orientation problems and unused opportunities. Specialists are blocked by the unrestricted 
access, excess demand, too low demand or inaccurate demand. This results in an actual 
access-restriction and congestion. Additionally, there are unequal opportunities for different 
social groups as the rich ones can switch to private insurances. 
One interviewee mentions conflicting interests: 
I once made a study on general practitioners including a comparison among different 
countries. The result was that there are some very effective models of primary care, effective 
and efficient too. This study though has never been published; it was simply affecting too 
many interests. In the current model there are no “Hausärzte”; some maybe act like oneif 
you are friends with them. 
(6) Involvement of interviewed stakeholders in the reform-process 
In order to assess the stakeholders’ involvement in the reform-process of the healthcare 
reform 2005, we use a model with four phases: information, reform design, legislation and 
implementation. However, due to a constant personnel change in positions and split roles, 
hardly anyone has an overview of the whole process, so it was difficult to obtain a clear 
picture for every stakeholder. 
(a) Payers 
A representative of a sickness fund mentions the involvement of the social security 
insurance (SV), although it is legally not a partner in the 15a-agreement-
negotiations. Another sickness fund representative notes his involvement in all four 
phases as far as it concerned the outpatient sector. 
(b) Providers 
Representatives from this stakeholder group remark their involvement mainly in the 
fourth phase of the reform-process, based on the fact that they are the service 
providers. However, theory recommends the early involvement of providers in order 
to avoid resistance in later phases.  
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(c) Patients 
One Patients’ representative mentions his involvement in the phase of 
implementation, giving advice for training in a DMP. Another interviewee was 
involved in phase two, three and four, in the latter not as much as in the previous 
phases. He describes his experience as follows: 
 
In the beginning - and I’m looking back until the year 2000 - everything was quite 
informal, actually I think it was by accident that patients were represented and we 
weren’t really involved. But that improved and later we were involved in phase two, 
three and four, although less in phase four. Now it’s even legally binding that we’re 
involved, although missing resources partly prevent us from involvement. 
(7) Integrated Planning 
The healthcare reform 2005 led to the renewal of the Austrian hospital plan with its fixed 
targets. The Austrian Structural Plan for Health (ÖSG) is supposed to develop a framework 
for all sectors with ample room for regional adaptions in the so called Regional Structural 
Plans for Health (RSG), enacted by the provincial health funds. Due to the split in 
competencies, SHI and the provinces are expected to make the necessary adjustments in 
their respective spheres of action according to this RSG. However, the central planning 
instrument ÖSG managed only in 2010 to make first plans for the outpatient sector and still 
leaves some areas untouched. What is more, the ÖSG is subject to the wishes of all 
stakeholders by the means of the Federal Health Commission or direct calls to the Austrian 
Planning Institute for Health. The nature of the ÖSG is also disputed, as it is not a law or 
ordinance, but only indirectly legitimised, e.g. by the 15a-agreement or the hospital payment 
system LKF, which demands certain criteria to be met in order to be eligible for the 
reimbursementof costs for some services. The RSGs vary in terms of quality and degree of 
consensus.  
Most of the interviewees are of the opinion that the introduction of the Austrian Structural 
Plan for Health was a first step in the right direction. Nevertheless, a stakeholder criticises 
the missing linkage to responsibilities and consequences as the available sanctioning 
mechanisms have never been applied. A sickness fund representative points out that these 
plans fail to be demand-oriented. 
It was an impulse in the right direction, but I don’t know whether the patient noticed anything. 
A government representative comments on integrated planning the following way: 
Integrated Planning is important; the question though is to what extent the outpatient sector 
is integrated. The plans should be used to better incorporate the social security (SV). If that’s 
working, there could really be an improvement. 
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(8) Missing Incentives 
A lack of motivation due to missing incentives for health funds might be one reason for 
possible poor conceptual design and for the lack of drastic reforms. A physicians’ 
representative also addresses the need for a more profound political change: 
The alternative clearly is an administrative reform with an adjustment of competencies and a 
clearance, simplification and reduction of financial flows too. That would be a clear solution. 
I’m afraid we don’t have to talk about the chances to realise that. That’s the government’s 
problem and not only in the area of health care, but as well in the sectors of education or 
national defence. 
This lack of incentivesis accompanied by the lack of politicians’ capacity, as reflected in 
some of the interviewees’ answers: 
It’s all about incrementing the power of politics. No question. The principal aim is to extend 
the room to manoeuvre because so far, politics are quite powerless in the outpatient sector. 
However, incentive problems regarding politicians and bureaucrats are omnipresent and 
difficult to be solved. Some interviewed stakeholders point out that an increase in 
transparency could result in more efficiency: 
I think payers and decision-makers should be forced to more transparency. The taxpayer 
and the insuree should understand the system better …who offers what at what costs…and 
which alternatives are there. In that way, patients could increase their saying in the decision-
making process. 
4.2. Reformpool 
As already mentioned in chapter three, there was a hesitant start of Reformpool-activity 
followed by a rise in 2007 and 2008 and a subsequent slowdown during the following years. 
This subsection aims to identify possible barriers and facilitators of implementing 
Reformpool-projects. 
(1) Payers 
Interviewees identify two major problems of the Reformpool-design. The first one is the 
missing mechanism to secure that well-performing projects are introduced into regular care, 
which, according to the interviewee, should have been an absolute condition. One 
stakeholder from the group of providers summarises the problem the following way: 
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“What is definitely a weakness of the Reformpool-projects is that they never evolved from the 
status of being a pilot project into regular care. There has hardly been a roll-out or an area-
wide implementation and integration in existing structures.” 
A patients’ ombudsman makes a similar point: 
“I was involved in the development of “Integrierte Versorgung Schlaganfall” (Integrated Care 
Stroke) in Upper Austria and it was possible to prove a reduced mortality caused by strokes 
– only due to organisational improvements. Unfortunately these results didn’t lead to an 
introduction of the same concepts in other provinces. In Styria the project went really well, 
but got lost between the federal province and social security and has not been taken up into 
regular operation. The reason not to implement it in Vienna was that the retirement pension 
insurance benefits from it, but doesn’t participate, apart from animosities between Vienna 
and Upper Austria in SHI.” 
Reasons for not implementing successful Reformpool-projects into regular care are 
numerous. Firstly, thorough evaluation is often missing, thus the information needed to 
objectively consider introduction as a regular service is not available. An attempt to introduce 
a standardised controlling-tool for nationwide usage was the so called “Reformpool 
manager”. Nevertheless, an expert stated that this particular tool focuses strongly on 
financial aspects and hence might not be fit to deliver an adequate basis for evaluation. He 
also suggested that not all answers required in this tool could be delivered at the time of 
evaluation, which inhibits a widespread use. For evaluated projects, the actual amount of 
shifts in financing of a service made regular is contested. Additionally, existing animosities 
and power games of payers and decision-makers act as a barrier and were also mentioned 
by several interviewees: 
It is very exhausting to be repeatedly confronted with dishonesty and animosity… for 
example false arguments that were already put aside and attacking people who represent a 
certain position personally instead of arguing against that position. 
An interviewee also stresses the importance of knowing the informal distribution of power in 
the process of decision-making. These informal aspects are often neglected in analysis, but 
can determine whether a project may be introduced or not. 
The second shortcoming identified was that the 2%of total health care spending available for 
the Reformpool projects were not dedicated exclusively to projects. 
Unfortunately, the project was designed with several flaws. The money should have been put 
aside. 
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An interviewee also mentions the lack of incentives as the available pot of money is only 
virtual. However, as there was no real incentive to realize a project, it was more convenient 
to simply leave the money untouched. An explanation for this incentive problem is also given 
by the economic theory of bureaucracy described in section 4.1. As the available pot is only 
virtual and its use has to be decided unanimously with the consent of another stakeholder, it 
might be more interesting on this level not to use the Reformpool-mechanism. Indeed, in the 
interviews we often heard of successful projects that were commissioned outside of the 
Reformpool. Those projects are named differently and the project-design can deviate form 
Reformpool-specific criteria. The federal provinces and sickness funds agree upon their 
share of financial contribution, or projects are conducted under the aegis of only one player. 
An interviewee addresses this point as follows: 
In every province they have to make their own inventions; something developed elsewhere 
cannot be right. Furthermore, Reformpool-projects mean that there will be a change of 
habits, it may lead to cost containment or at least cost reduction for one group, but additional 
costs for the other one and the outcomes cannot be measured easily. The qualitative benefit 
for the patient is evident, but doesn’t influence the decisions. A change would mean a loss of 
power. 
Numerous experts are convinced that a solution to the problemsof the Reformpool would be 
to put aside the fund of the Reformpool and block its use for other purposes than Reformpool 
projects. 
(2) Providers 
Czypionka and Röhrling (2009) found in their analysis of Reformpool-activity that, in Lower 
Austria, services of general practitioners in the outpatient sector could be reduced, although 
consultations at outpatient specialist’s practices increased. Physicians were content with 
quality and coverage of the projects and declared not to have experienced any negative 
economic consequences. In addition, there was a reduction in days spent in the hospital as 
well as in hospital admissions. In Upper Austria, the stroke-unit project is widely accepted 
among physicians.However, better information on measures, implementation, and progress 
among attending physicians is required. The project “Mobile Kinderkrankenpflege” (mobile 
paediatric nursing care) in Vorarlberg is positively assessed by physicians who would 
support an introduction of the project to regular care.Furthermore, there is no adjustment of 
regular care-funds and fee for service rates do not decrease.  
(3) Patients 
In Lower Austria, the evaluation showed that 95% of questioned patients would recommend 
the project. The Reformpool-project “Integrated Care Stroke” in Upper Austria is widely 
accepted among patients as well. In Vorarlberg, the project “Mobile Palliative-team” was 
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quite successful too, as the main goals of improving the quality of life and care among 
palliative patients and reduce the number of patients in palliative stations in the inpatient 
sector could be achieved. The intended frequency of care of about one hundred patients 
could not be achieved during the observation period (only thirty patients participated) 
(Czypionka and Röhrling 2009). 
(4) Conclusions 
The hypotheses of our previous publication concerning the Reformpool-activity 
(Czypionka/Röhrling 2009) were confirmed by the interviews conducted in the current 
project, and some aspects can be added. The main weaknesses of the Reformpool can be 
summed up as follows: 
1) Virtual character of the funds 
Since the funds are not dedicated to the projects, they have to be deducted from the 
current operational funding. In contrast to the German system, regular tariffs are not 
reduced by using money in Reformpool projects. Therefore, every project is an 
additional financial burden in an already strained financial situation. What is more, 
funds willrather be used outside the Reformpool, as in this case, there is no 
requirement to involve the other stakeholders in the process or meet the criteria set 
by the Ministry of Health. These misleading incentives inhibit the development of 
Reformpool-projects, although capacities would be available on both the payers’ and 
providers’ side. 
2) Conflicts of interest 
SHI and the province have to agree on a project. However, there rarely is a project 
that benefits both partners equally. To determine whether a project is beneficial for 
either the SHI or the province, it is not legally required to conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis, although it may be done on some occasions. This decision is mostly based 
on the perception of either party to decide if the project is profitable. The majority of 
good projects would allocate services to the optimal setting and thus reduce costs. 
The lack of cost-shifting keeps SHI and the federal state from agreeing on projects 
as in many cases of integrated care, costs in the inpatient sector decrease while 
they rise in the outpatient sector. Payer’s representatives of the outpatient sector 
(social security intuitions) are therefore not willing to bear the additional costs. Up to 
now, no proper system of cost-shifting between the inpatient and outpatient sector 
exists, and quantifying costs saved in the inpatient sector is quite difficult. Hospitals 
often argue that they save only marginal costs, not average costs, as they would be 
left with empty beds. As the current dual financing system has been in place more 
than five decades, rivalry, in some cases even animosity and a lacking will to reach a 
consensus on Reformpool-projects seem to be deeply rooted and often determined 
by specific actors. 
Nevertheless, the costs the payer has to bear rise even if total costs can be reduced. 
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3) Uncertainty 
As providers have to bear the initial costs of project development, this framework 
constitutes an increased financial risk to conduct the project – after all, the 
commission of projects is not mandatory. This definitely reduces the willingness to 
set up a project in the first place. 
4) Providers’ interests 
For current providers of healthcare and especially their representatives, there is little 
incentive to engage in projects that tend to reduce costs. In fact, in our previous 
evaluation, we found many projects that rather expand services than reduce them, 
thus filling gaps in provision rather than rearranging it. What is more, there is no 
explicit legislation allowing deviations from collective agreements within a project. 
This fact can act as an additional barrier to integrated care programs as contracts 
between sickness funds and the chamber of physicians apply to all physicians and it 
is not possible to close a contract with individual providers 
5) Scale 
Given the nature of far-reaching projects that are intended to change the way 
services are provided, they have to be seen as an uncertain investment. However, 
many federal provinces in Austria have fewer than 500,000 inhabitants, and the 
overall funds in healthcare, let alone the 1% or 2% of funds available for 
Reformpool-projects, are not sufficient for such an investment as projects are 
designed decentrally and the human capital required is very high compared to the 
number of inhabitants of small federal provinces. Innovation economics tells us that 
various attempts are needed to identify meaningful and successful new ways of 
healthcare provision. In addition to this, a template for projects developed at the 
central level and a mechanism to share findings are missing 
6) Institutional factors and habits 
Important aspects concerning the Reformpool projects are institutional or habitual 
factors. Our interviews confirmed that in some cases ideas were rejected also 
because they were developed by some other institution, perceived as a rival. This is 
the case between some provinces and social security institutions, but also among 
provinces as well as within SHI. What is more, strong tensions could be detected 
between SHI and physicians and physician representatives. Those tensions are 
mainly caused by distrust (physicians may charge more services than they actually 
perform while feeling controlled by SHI) and missing or wrong information. 
4.3. Disease Management Programmes 
Several interviewees mention that the initiative to start DMPs in Austria is already a big step 
forward and they are convinced that the existence of guidelines will reduce variation in 
treatment procedures. A representative also sees an advantage in its potential to improve 
quality. Interviewed providers remark the following strengths of DMPs: Quality management, 
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the reduction of variance and the continuity of care.The existence of DMPs in Austria can be 
regarded as a stepping stone, despite the numerous weaknesses and barriers to integrated 
care programmes, resulting in low participation rates of both providers and patients. One 
stakeholder summarises these barriers the following way: 
The problem is still the co-ordination between payers and providers, for example between 
the social security institutions and physicians because commitment is quite differing. From a 
patient’s point of view the programme does not work well, it’s being rejected. Physicians are 
at the interface and they failed to transport the DMPs to the patients. That’s why it’s rejected. 
He emphasises the importance of transporting the information of DMPs correctly and 
positively to the patient. If the office-based physician opposes the DMP for whatever reason, 
the physician will then, of course, not encourage the patients to participate. Moreover, for a 
patient, physicians act as opinion leaders and most patients will stay loyal to their physicians. 
In this subsection, the roles of different actors will be analysed by means of interviews and 
literature in order to identify possible barriers and problems. 
(1) Payers 
As DMPs are supposed to have cost containing effects, payers should be more than 
interested in making them work. Even so, there are so far no incentive mechanisms for 
sickness funds to offer DMPs, because there is no competition or financial advantage. Many 
sickness funds are indebted and cannot afford to invest in new projects, although they might 
contribute to a reduction in costs in the longrun. In subsection 4.1, the economic theory of 
politics and bureaucracy and the principal agent problem are mentioned as possible 
explanations for existing incentive problems between payers and decision-makers. Different 
goals of the stakeholders involved prevent the health care system from undertaking profound 
reforms and introduce integrated care policies. Furthermore, informal difficulties such as 
animosity and competition between institutions and provinces make improvements even less 
likely. In the case of “Therapie Aktiv”, an interview partner pointed out those animosities 
between sickness funds existed concerning the programme, as the Styrian and Viennese 
sickness funds play the major role in it.  
Some failures of the DMP-design were repeatedly addressed in discussions, but until now 
decision-makers failed to improve the framework of integrated care programmes 
What is more, an interviewee confirmed that sickness funds tend to be slow in adopting new 
ideas. Many of his recommendations to change the structure of the way the DMP was 
delivered were rejected. 
I H S — Czypionka, Ulinski, Hochmuth / Towards better care co-ordination— 35 
 
 
 
(2) Providers 
Providers are often accused of representing the main barrier for a proper implementation of 
DMPs, although they were included in the development process, as is pointed out repeatedly 
by the group of payers. They criticise the physician’s lack of acceptance, which is in their 
opinion mainly based on their fear of administrative costs and of structural changes in their 
office. 
The problem can to a certain extent be traced back to misinformation of physicians. There is, 
for example, a widespread prejudice among physicians that the participation in DMPs is 
accompanied by an enormous administrative workload. In turn many physicians refrain from 
informing themselves about the DMPs let alone participating in them. However, once a 
patient is enrolled and the initial documentation is made, the physician only has to fill in a 
one-page form per patient per year. Another problem is the physician’s difficulty identifying 
his or her diabetes patients due to software problems and inconsistency. According to a 
payer’s representative, administrative requirements were already reduced to almost half, 
made available electronically and now work via the physicians’ software. However, the 
software has to be periodically maintained, resulting in increased costs. 
A representative of a sickness funds sees deficiencies mainly in the physician’s office 
management: 
What is being communicated to us is that they are dealing with difficult patients and a lack of 
temporal resources. I think physician could at least outsource some of the work, but they 
have deficienciesin their office- and patient-management. 
Another sickness fund representative who has visited a lot of office-backed physicians raises 
another issue: 
Physicians, especially in rural areas, are used to having a full waiting room. They are not 
accustomed to make appointments once a quarter with a diabetes patient. That would be a 
change of habits, and a change of habit is always very difficult. 
Patients’ representatives as well as physicians specialised on diabetes see the core of the 
acceptance-problem partly in the lack of ability to treat diabetes patients correctly. Some 
physicians might not have the necessary training in and knowledge of the use of modern 
methods in measuring the blood glucose level or the accurate handling of insulin Due to 
documentation requirements in DMPs their shortcomings in treatment would then be laid 
bare. Additionally, the training offered to physicians in the course of the DMP seems to be 
insufficient given the complexity of the disease, but physicians might be reluctant to admit 
that they would require further training. A patient’s ombudsman mentions that the Chamber 
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of Physicians itself acts as a barrier to the implementation of DMPs as well as it is convinced 
that its physicians can treat diabetes perfectly and hence see no need for change. 
There are some cases in which patients require very complex treatment, exceeding the 
capacities of a general practitioner. A possible way to deal with such patients would be a 
transfer to second care level with diabetes specialists. For general practitioners this step 
could however result in a loss of patients, if the diabetes specialist offers other medical 
services as well (for example if the diabetes specialist is also a specialist for internal 
medicine). Physicians might therefore be reluctant to transfer their patients to such a second 
care level.  
Another major obstacle is a general lack of trust between SHI and their contract physicians. 
An interviewee stated that the SHI are very keen on maintaining a high degree of control 
regarding the work of the contracted physicians. This phenomenon is especially apparent in 
the overly pedantic contracts for DMPs. Naturally, physicians show considerable scepticism 
towards concepts brought forth to them by the SHI as they are always concerned that this 
might just be another attempt to impose more control onto them. Interestingly enough, the 
same expert suggested that SHI should communicate the advantages of participating in a 
DMP directly to the physicians, as the Chamber of Physicians might forward only biased 
information to the physicians.   
In order to motivate physicians to participate in DMPs, financial incentives were set, but they 
were not as high as in other countries (e.g. England). As stated by one interviewee, DMPs 
can be profitable for the physician after a certain threshold and the amortisation of 
investments, if the physician’s practice was restructured successfully and opportunity costs 
were minimised: 
If a physician has reached a critical mass of about 200 to 250 patients participating in the 
DMP, it is worth changing the organisational processes. Once they changed the process, 
they can cope with any number of patients and it’s profitable for them. 
An expert considered the financial incentive system as exhausted as these incentives did not 
lead to the expected participation rate of physicians.  
By means of interviews with Austrian stakeholders in the field of health care, several main 
barriers regarding lacking incentives and possibilities to motivate physicians could be 
identified. 
(a) Attitude towards guidelines 
Evidence-based guidelines should ensure the implementation of medical innovations 
in routine daily practice and overcome the gap between evidence and practice in 
health care (Grol & Grimshaw, 2003). 
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Office-based physicians are used to working independently, following the instruction 
of treatment and making decisions based on the physician’s professional experience 
and judgement. As DMPs are accompanied by guidelines and strict documentation 
requirements, some physicians see that as a threat to their professional 
independence. This might lead them to reject the participation in a DMP and to refer 
to guidelines as “cookbook medicine”, as has already been discussed in section 4.1 
 
Guidelines seem to be unjustifiablyill-reputed among outpatient physicians, 
something that becomes clear examining the DMP-guidelines closely. In individual 
cases it is of course possible to deviate from those guidelines. An office-based 
physician though, may feel undervalued as he or she is dealing with those patients 
at a daily base and has experience. Some might be suspicious that those people 
designing the evidence-based guidelines might not have the experience of dealing 
with diabetes patients on a one to one basis.  
 
Czypionka and Röhrling (2009) point out that, in the Netherlands, physicians have 
been following specific guidelines for decades with satisfactory results and general 
acceptance by physicians. Furthermore, some of the guidelines are not compulsory, 
but merely intend to “guide” the physician. Several experts emphasise the 
importance for both doctors and patients to choose an apt treatment procedure 
satisfying both (Ärztezeitung, 2006) . 
 
A first crucial step towards higher participation of physicians in DMPs should be to 
thoroughly address the physicians’ dismissive attitude about medical guidelines. This 
could be done by designing guidelines in such a way that physicians do not feel the 
threat of losing their therapeutic independence and freedom. Furthermore, 
guidelines should always take into account the newest findings in medical research. 
The physicians’ attitude towards guidelines may also be affected positively by a 
supporting stance of the Chamber of Austrian Physicians and other opinion leaders. 
(b) Documentation 
The documentation requirements of a DMP are repeatedly mentioned as a barrier to 
the programmes’ success. For physicians the requirements regarding documentation 
in DMP seem to be highly repellent as in many cases the perceived bureaucratic 
burden outweighs the relatively high financial compensation. However, physicians 
are often incorrectly informed and think documentation would be more time-
consuming than it is in practice. An interviewee raised the point that the 
documentation process should be fully integratedin the physician’s software as up to 
now documentation within DMPs has been made on paper exclusively. The 
documentation is mainly a challenge for medical information systems. The aim 
should be to create a software tool that facilitates those requirements and supports 
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the physician in several issues such as setting target agreements for weight et 
cetera. Well-designed software could contribute to a paradigm shift from paper work 
to electronic documentation and, in turn, towards more efficient use of the available 
data (Beck et al. 2009). 
The bureaucratic effort can be reduced by electronic data transmission. However, 
the software needs to be purchased, maintained and updated regularly creating 
additional costs. It is difficult to determine a number of physicians that are already 
working with electronic documentation. At the moment it is often the case that two 
software tools are used simultaneously, on one hand the regular physician’s 
software and the DMP-software on the other. Integrated software would facilitate the 
usage and could furthermore reduce time spent on documentation. However, this is 
not easily achieved, since physicians use different systems for their own needs 
(documentation, patient organisation, archiving of diagnostic information). If the 
DMP-documentation is to be integrated, several software providers need to be 
involved and kept up-to-date. If separate software is used, some connection is 
needed as the bulk of information on the patient is in the physician’s initial software. 
 
Another aspect is that physicians feel controlled by these tight documentation 
requirements because errors in diagnosis or treatment can be identified easily. A 
further point raised in this context was that the physicians’ incompetence to treat 
diabetes would be revealed. 
 
(c) Financial rewards 
Physicians receive additional remuneration for treating patients enrolled in a DMP. 
Among the interviewees, contradictory opinions on the effect of financial rewards on 
DMPs are present. The opportunity costs of providing DMPs (when the physician 
has to cut back on other services offered) could exceed the remuneration, effectively 
resulting in negative incentives. A payer’s representative however spoke out in 
favour of financial rewards: 
The incentive problem can only be solved with financial rewards; those are most 
effective and the dissolving of the permanent status of the contract type agreement 
between the social security and physicians. 
 
On the other hand, a sickness fund representative thought that purely financial 
incentives were already at their limit and concluded that alternative approaches have 
to be conceived. 
 
In my opinion, financial rewards are exhausted. What amount would we have to pay 
a physician to offer a DMP? We need another incentive, but I don’t know which one. 
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We were thinking about facilitating the daily routine with another software tool and 
there are trainings to better organise the office management too. 
 
Office-based physicians in Austria are self-employed and their services have to pay 
off financially. Regarding DMPs, physicians have to keep in mind not only the 
financial rewards for the examinations of a DMP patient, but also the opportunity 
costs. Instead of a DMP-session, the physician could offer a number of profitable 
services to other patients. What is more, the physician faces sunk costs. Re-
organising thepractice and adopting the rules of the DMP will pay off only if a certain 
threshold of patients is reached. This is also true for the group trainings. One 
solution for the group trainings therefore is to organise them centrally, i.e. by mobile 
teams delivering them instead of the contract physicians. It would be a failure though 
to reroute them to other physicians, as they might take over the patients completely. 
(d) Organisation of Workflows 
Participation in a DMP confronts an office-based physician with organisational 
challenges. If the implementation of the DMP is poorly integrated in the daily routine, 
additional costs can incur and make the DMP to a burden for the physician. 
Therefore, practice workflows have to be re-organised and processes need to be 
standardised. For some practices it might be the best to employ a part-time assistant 
who takes care of patient enrolment, documentation and patient logistics.  
Concerning the re-organisation of workflows, the collaboration with the receptionist 
and/or the medical assistant is of great importance. The assistant may prepare the 
DMP-patients before they meet the physician; as an example he or she could take 
care of removing the patient’s shoes and socks, so that the physician can take a 
look at the patient’s feet, do the weight check or measure the blood pressure in an 
extra room, while the next patient is waiting. Depending on the number of DMP-
patients in a practice, a re-organisation can make a programme-participation 
profitable. This issue is raises by an interviewee too: 
 
In the beginning, there has to be an organisational change as well as a restructuring 
of the physician’s way of thinking. If the organisation is adjusted then it will work just 
fine. Some office-based physicians really re-organised their practice structure and 
enrolled eighty to hundred patients. Once they have routine, it is financially profitable 
too. 
 
At the beginning of the participation in a DMP, a trained DMP-advisor may visit the 
physician’s practice to help restructuring the workflows. 
Regarding DMPs it could be favourable for physicians to organise in group practices 
and thus benefit from a reduction in cost due to economies of scale and economies 
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of scope. For example, they could employ an assistant for DMP patients and make 
joint investments that pay off faster. 
Unfortunately, in Austria, contract physicians mainly work in single practice, and 
diabetes nurses like in the Netherlands neither exist nor is it feasible to employ 
them. Both factors make it more difficult to establish the DMP. 
(e) Provision of patient training 
The patient’s first step to participate in a DMP is to take part in a group training in 
which he or she is trained to better understand and cope with the disease and to 
learn self-management competencies. It is of utter importance for the patient to 
understand the necessity to change his/her lifestyle regarding nutrition and exercise. 
In the DMP for diabetes patients, a special training for patients needing insulin 
exists. The office-based physician has to organise the training units and receives 
financial remuneration offering them. However, at least six patients (or three needing 
insulin) have to take part in such a group training. In order to be able to offer those 
training sessions, physicians themselves have to complete a ten-hour-training. If 
there are only a few diabetes patients in a practice, the physician’s incentive to 
provide training will be lower. It is possible to outsource the patient training but then 
the physician wouldnot receive his/her financial remuneration, and possibly lose the 
patient to the colleague providing the training. Latest developments allow physicians 
to license as a “Therapie Aktiv”-physician via e-learning. After passing the final 
exam, physicians can register immediately for “Therapie Aktiv”. This e-learning 
method has the potential to facilitate the participation of physicians in DMPs. 
(f) Opinion leaders and communication 
The physician’s decision whether or not to participate in a DMP is often influenced 
by clinical opinion leaders whocan be other physicians or physicians’ representatives 
such as the Austrian Chamber of Physicians. Local opinion leaders such as experts 
or physicians valued by practitioners can make an important contribution to a more 
positive picture of DMPs. Their opinions can be spread via media channels, 
conferences, publications and informal meetings. 
The majority of diabetes patients are under medical treatment of a general 
practitioner. Therefore it is essential to convince their general practitioner to 
participate in a DMP. 
Furthermore, there is need to improve the communication between sickness funds 
and office-based physicians. Their relationship is often characterised by distrust, as 
the sickness funds check whether they really offered the services they are charging. 
Therefore, sickness funds have to do more than to promote DMPs; they additionally 
have to form the consciousness among physicians that by participating in a DMP, 
they offer the patient a much better treatment and contribute to a lifestyle 
improvement and life extension. 
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(3) Patients 
DMPs can increase a patient’s quality of life as well as his or her life expectancy significantly. 
Nevertheless, a participation in a DMP incurs several changes to a patient’s daily routine, as 
goals of weight reduction etc. may have been set together with the physician. 
One interviewee emphasises the hardship of a lifestyle change for the patient following the 
participation in a DMP: 
Senior patients have diabetes mellitus type 2, and that’s not without a reason; they hardly 
exercise and don’t have healthy eating habits. But that’s their lifestyle and it’s very difficult to 
change that. If he or she is participating in a DMP, the physicians try to force the patient to 
take up a healthier lifestyle. 
A physicians’ representative thinks that people are primarily responsible for themselves. It 
should be neither the payers’ nor the providers’ duty to convince them to participate in a 
DMP. He emphasises the people’s own accountability: 
What the Austrian population does not have is health-awareness. In general, it is, therefore, 
necessary to increase the population’s individual responsibilities. 
However, an interviewee pointed out that health awareness could be raised through better 
information of the patients which, in turn, could induce patients to actively seek participation 
in DMPs. 
I think the main weakness lies in the lack of information for the patients. A DMP could be 
presented to them in a manner that they really want to participate because it means an 
improvement of their quality of life. They have to demand it from their physician. But in some 
regions there are influencing physicians that may be in favour or opposed to a DMP. If they 
are opposed, they don’t really inform their patients and influence other doctors, resulting in a 
lower participation rate. What I have heard so far all stakeholders are quite content with the 
DMP-outcomes. 
Another stakeholder addresses the topic of the influencing physician as well: 
Patients trust their general practitioner and if he or she’s in favour of the DMP, they will enrol. 
The patient is mostly loyal to his or her general practitioner. And, why won’t the physician 
participate? Because he or she’s afraid, his or her lack of knowledge could be exposed! 
In order to motivate patients to participate in a DMP, the first step is to provide broad 
information for them. By default, patients are in the standard treatment procedure and have 
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to demand explicitly to participate in a DMP. Various forms of spreading information to the 
patients are available, reaching from a conversation with one’s general practitioner or 
specialist at the moment ofdiagnosis or later, telephone calls or postal information 
(magazines, flyers, personal letters) sent by sickness funds. 
(a) Informing the patient 
The most important point in delivering the information of a DMP is to transmitit 
adequately. The patient is more likely to participate if he or she is personally addressed 
and if he or she has the opportunity to ask questions. Furthermore, it is essential to 
clearly explain the range of benefits that result for the patient by participating in an 
integrated care programme. 
If the patient feels like he or she is manipulated to take part in the programme, he or she 
might refuse to participate and even act as an opinion leader to other potential 
participants. That is why the mode of information and benefit-presentation has to be 
chosen carefully. As participation in a DMP does not involve extra fees for the patient, he 
or she might not value the programme as much as if it wassubject to additional costs. 
An interviewed representative of the physicians in Austria is convinced that the patient is 
individually responsible for his or her chosen lifestyle: 
I wouldn’t say patients should have to be motivated, the government though should offer 
the opportunity of the freedom to choose and make all opportunitiesand consequences 
transparent. 
A sickness fund representative believes that the organisation of patients in groups could 
be motivating: 
The patient has to take a look in the mirror, how he or she will look in several years ’ time. 
Unfortunately they don’t feel any immediate improvements by participating, but the 
effects are in the long run. The most successful concept to motivate is in group training, I 
think. 
Regarding the provision of information to the patient, the principal-agent problem
2
 can 
play a role again. Within the framework of DMPs, this problem is present when it comes 
to the point that the physician could inform the patient about participating in a DMP. If the 
physician believes to benefit from offering DMPs, he will recommend them to his patients 
but, if he generally is opposed to DMPs, he might not mention them or present them in a 
negative way. The physician therefore has an advantage due to his superior expertise 
                                                     
2
 see section 4.1(3) for more information on Principal-Agent Theory. 
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and the patient’s confidence in him. The provision of broad information via different 
channels can reduce this phenomenon of asymmetric information. SHI could take action 
in this field by engaging patients directly, e.g. by launching a magazine to inform and 
educate insurees about new health programmes and the potential advantages of 
participation. 
(b) Financial incentives 
Currently there are no financial incentives for patients to participate in a DMP, 
although the idea of financial incentives was discussed briefly. Those incentives 
could consist for example of a bonus or reduced insurance contribution. However, 
patients might perceive such financial rewards as unjustified advantage. In general, 
consumers associate higher quality with higher prices, which could cause adverse 
effects if financial incentives are used to convince patients to take part in a DMP. 
Additionally, the administrative and technical efforts can be challenging and 
expensive. 
In order to motivate patients, it is necessary to fully inform them about the existence 
of DMPs and the benefits generated for them. If the patients are well informed 
aboutthe advantages of DMPs, they may even exert pressure on their general 
practitioner to participate in a DMP. Otherwise the general practitioner might lose his 
or her patient to another physician. 
(4) Conclusions 
There are a number of problems for the implementation of DMPs. Concerning the 
institutional framework, the scepticism about guidelines and electronic information 
systems, both prerequisites for DMPs, make it harder to get rooted in the Austrian 
healthcare system in the first place. Distrust between SHI and physicians makes it 
harder to establish a DMP, because it might be perceived as an attempt to usurp the 
freedom of treatment. What is more, due to the lack of group practices or trained 
diabetes personnel employed by contract physicians the physician has to cope with 
the additional workload all by him- or herself. Financial incentives might be high in 
gross terms, but the physician faces opportunity costs, which are higher without the 
support by trained personnel. Another problem seems to be the fixed costs that 
imply a threshold of participating patients. The complexity of diabetes treatment is 
also a challenge in so far as inexperienced physicians may fear that tight 
documentation might reveal their inadequateness in dealing with diabetes patients 
and thus permanently ruin their reputation.  
Payers also have little incentive to promote a DMP, as the DMP does not constitute a 
selling pointdue to the lack of competition between sickness funds. 
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5. Conclusions based on the case study 
This case study reveals that most stakeholders are indeed willing and determined to improve 
care co-ordination for chronically ill patients. Since the health care reform in 2005 the legal 
base to introduce co-ordinated care programmes at the intersection of the inpatient and 
outpatient sector is given, but serious barriers for a proper implementation of integrated care 
projects still exist. 
Structural problems, which are deeply rooted in the Austrian political system, pose the first 
major barrier for a widespread implementation of DMPs. The federalist structure is seen to 
be a drawback to an efficient operation of the health care system by almost all interviewees. 
Furthermore, the sectoral fragmentation regarding the inpatient and outpatient sector and the 
current financing system make it very difficult to introduce co-ordinated care projects. These 
issues contribute to a certain animosity and competition between the inpatient and outpatient 
sector, provinces and SHI. Informal issues of people in decision-making positions were 
repeatedly addressed to be a considerable barrier. 
Another problem can be found in the design of the Reformpool. Here, several issues were 
identified. First, funds have to be exclusively made available to projects. Moreover, it is of 
utmost importance that the overall benefit to the system becomes the main criterion for 
adopting a project; in the current systemprojects must be beneficial for both partners, and 
thus promising projects are often hindered. Projects should probably be commissioned by 
the Federal Health Commission rather than by the provincial health funds, which might be 
too small in some cases. What is more, there will seldom be a project that benefits both 
sides. Developing a mechanism to effectively adopt successful projects into regular funding 
is also critical and should therefore be addressed with high priority. 
Regarding DMPs, several steps are necessary in order to ensure higher acceptance among 
physicians and patients. Concerning the institutional framework, improvements have to be 
made to kick-start group practices, which form a better basis for DMPs. Specialised nurses 
could relieve physicians of some of their work, thus also addressing the problem of 
opportunity costs. Otherwise, the DMP would only crowd out other services. In the long run, 
it is recommendable to take measures to improve trust and cooperation between SHI and 
physicians as well as the relations between sickness funds. 
On the payer level, some form of incentive has to be found to make DMPs more attractive for 
the sickness funds. New means of communication should be used to inform patients and 
thus increase their interest and the incentive for the providers to offer the programme.  
On the provider level, physicians mainly need support that does not affect their professional 
pride. The issue of too few patients for training groups could be addressed by establishing 
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mobile teams that provide them. Professional deficits could be addressed by some form of 
peer system, e.g. a colleague experienced in diabetes care who can be contacted informally 
with questions. This might also apply to organisational issues, as physicians are not normally 
trained in management skills. To cope with information deficits, more efforts to inform 
objectively about the programme should be made. Also, it isadvisable to identify and engage 
local opinion leaders astheir approval will have a positive impact on the willingness of their 
colleagues to participate in DMPs. 
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